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Abstract—The paper starts with the discussion of the issue of
objectivity versus subjectivity, stressing that while an absolute
objectivity is not attainable, nevertheless trying to be as objec-
tive as possible constitutes a higher value, necessary for hard
science and technology. Dangers and errors of the subjectivist
reduction of objectivity to power and money attempted by the
postmodern sociology of science are discussed. Then we turn
to the problem of subjective versus objective decision analy-
sis and ranking. It is shown that while all classical decision
theory aims at a rational analysis and support of subjective
decisions, there are important application cases, particularly
in managerial problems, when the decision maker prefers to
avoid specifying her/his preferences and needs decision analy-
sis – e.g., ranking of decision options – that is as objective as
possible. An approach to decision support that might be eas-
ily adapted for such objective ranking is the reference point
methodology; its application is shown on examples. One of
these examples is actually not an application of the method-
ology, but a real life problem that motivated the development
of objective ranking. The examples illustrate that objective
ranking might be important for management, including also
management of telecommunication networks.
Keywords— subjective ranking, objective ranking, reference
point approaches, objectivity.
1. Introduction
The words subjective and objective might be used in
a derogatory sense, but we shall use them in their origi-
nal epistemic sense:
– subjective as resulting from personal cognition or
preferences;
– objective as trying to represent outside world without
bias and presuppositions.
Thus, we can say that all contemporary decision analysis,
aiming at supporting the decision maker in using her/his
own preferences for selecting best personal decisions, con-
centrates actually on computerized, rational support of sub-
jective decisions. But what means computerized support?
It should include at least two aspects:
– a computerized representation of knowledge (includ-
ing data, rules, models) about a part of outside reality
pertinent for the decision situation, which should be
as objective as possible;
– a computerized support for combining the subjective
preferences of an individual decision maker with an
objective representation of the pertinent knowledge
in selecting the actual decision.
However, there are practical cases (illustrated by examples
given later) when the decision maker does not want to spec-
ify her/his individual preferences, prefers to obtain sug-
gested decisions – or a ranking of a list of decision options
speciﬁed as objectively as possible.
We know that full objectivity is impossible. This was
shown already by Heisenberg [8], we discuss it in more
detail later – and contemporary physics still considers a syn-
thesis of Heisenbergian indeterminacy and Einsteinian rel-
ativity as the most important problem in science. How-
ever, technology and engineering cannot develop without
trying to be as objective as possible, for example, with-
out submitting technological tools to destructive Popperian
falsiﬁcation tests.
Postmodern social science ridicules Popperian falsiﬁca-
tionism and postulates that all our knowledge is subjective,
but we shall discuss the errors of postmodern sociology of
science later. Here we just conclude that there is a need
of both subjective and objective aspects of knowledge and
decisions.
2. Objectivity versus subjectivity
At the beginning, we must add some philosophical com-
ments on subjectivity and objectivity. The destruction of
the industrial era episteme [25, 28] – sometimes called
not quite precisely positivism or scientism – started early,
e.g., since Heisenberg [8] has shown that not only a mea-
surement depends on a theory and on instruments, but also
the very fact of measurement distorts the measured vari-
able.
This was followed by diverse philosophical debates, sum-
marized, e.g., by Quine [20] who has shown that the logical
empiricism (neo-positivism) is logically inconsistent itself,
that all human knowledge “is a man-made fabric that im-
pinges on existence only along the edges”. This means that
there is no absolute objectivity.
However, this was quite diﬀerently interpreted by hard sci-
ences and by technology, which nevertheless tried to remain
as objective as possible, and by social sciences which, in
some cases, went much further to maintain that all knowl-
edge is subjective – results from a discourse, is constructed,
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negotiated, relativist, depends on power and money (see,
e.g., [13]).
This has led to a general divergence of the episteme – the
way of constructing and justifying knowledge, characteristic
for a given cultural era (see [4]), we add only that also
characteristic for a cultural sphere – of the following three
diﬀerent cultural spheres (see [25]):
– of hard and natural sciences;
– of technology proper (understood as the art of con-
structing tools);
– of social sciences and humanities.
Even if we (the technologists) respect the diﬀerent culture
of social sciences and humanities, we must protest against
extreme epistemic interpretations that become fashionable
today. For example, some our colleagues maintain that
“There is no universe, but only a multiverse – and to realize
this is liberating”. We propose that they liberate themselves
by falsifying their conviction, applying a hard wall test:
posit yourself against hard wall, close your eyes, and try
to convince yourself that, since there is only a multiverse
(and, according to the quantum theory, there is a nonzero
probability of penetrating the wall), the wall does not exist.
If you cannot convince yourself, then there is no multiverse,
because reality apparently has some universal features; if
you can convince yourself, run with your head ahead, in
order to falsify your conviction.
On the other hand, even if we should try to develop an
integrated episteme for the new era of knowledge civiliza-
tion (see [28]), this new episteme must take into account
that absolute objectivity is not attainable, because of the
following basic principles.
Multimedia principle: words are just an approximate code
to describe much more complex reality, visual and gener-
ally preverbal information is much more powerful and re-
lates to intuitive knowledge and reasoning; future records of
the intellectual heritage of humanity will have multimedia
character, thus stimulating creativity.
This multimedia principle has many implications, but we
stress here only the most obvious: if words are just an
approximate code, then absolute truth and absolute objec-
tivity are obviously not possible. But we need truth even
in elementary social discourse, need objectivity at least in
technology. Thus, truth and objectivity are higher values,
ideals that we try to attain as closely as possible even if
they are not fully attainable.
This is related to another basic principle. The concepts of
punctuated evolution from biology, order emerging out of
chaos from computational modeling, emergence of software
out of hardware, multiple layers of protocols in telecommu-
nications jointly justify the following.
Emergence principle: new concepts and properties of
a system emerge with increased level of complexity, and
these properties are qualitatively diﬀerent than and irre-
ducible to the properties of parts of the system.
This principle implies a fundamental conceptual change.
Firstly, it shows that the arguments of creationism against
evolution – that evolution could not produce irreducible
complexity – are ignorant of the obvious fact that the evo-
lution of civilization, much faster than the biological evo-
lution thus easier to observe, has recently produced sev-
eral examples of the emergence of irreducible complexity,
starting with the emergence of software out of hardware.
Secondly, even if it might seem that emergence principle
logically results from the principle of synergy or holism –
that the whole is more than the sum of its parts (see [1, 2]),
this is not necessarily a correct interpretation. The principle
of synergy or holism does not say that the whole should
have essentially diﬀerent, irreducible properties, than the
parts of the system.
However, we can see that higher values, such as truth or
objectivity, are also higher level concepts that emerged
evolutionary in civilisation evolution. Thus, they are ir-
reducible to lower level concepts, such as power and
money.
This is not just a philosophic debate. If scientiﬁc objectiv-
ity could be reduced to money and power, than managers
would try to force us, engineers, to use fraudulent engineer-
ing for proﬁt; and, more generally, postmodern sociology
of science gives a nice excuse for an unlimited privatization
of knowledge.
The argument for privatization of public resources is based
on the phenomenon of tragedy of commons (devastation
of a degradable resource, if used without limits). How-
ever, knowledge is not degradable (see [14]), it increases
with use, hence it is more advantageous for a community
to keep knowledge public. But there are strong economic
forces today interested in an unrestricted privatization of
knowledge; and postmodernism provides them with an ide-
ology.
Thus, we should clearly point out the errors of postmodern
sociology of science. For example, Latour [13] argues that
since the concepts of nature and reality are constructed by
us, they cannot be the cause of our knowledge, because an
eﬀect cannot be a cause. His argument is logically erro-
neous, in obvious ignorance about the mechanism of pos-
itive feedback that is the basis of the evolution of knowl-
edge. Hence, it is not true that knowledge can be reduced
to money and power.
In order to show that the postmodern episteme is not the
only possible one, we present here another description of
the relation of human knowledge to nature [28]. First,
from a technological perspective we do not accept the as-
sumption of postmodern philosophy that “nature” is only
a construction of our minds and has only local character.
Of course, the word nature refers both to the construction
of our minds and to something more – to some persist-
ing, universal (to some degree) aspects of the world sur-
rounding us. People are not alone in the world; in ad-
dition to other people, there exists another part of real-
ity, that of nature, although part of this reality has been
converted by people to form human-made, mostly techno-
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logical systems. There are aspects of reality that are lo-
cal and multiple, there are aspects that are more or less
universal.
Second, the general relation of human knowledge to real-
ity might be described as follows. People, motivated by
curiosity and aided by intuition and emotions, observe re-
ality and formulate hypotheses about properties of nature,
of other people, of human relations; they also construct
tools; together, we call all this knowledge. People test and
evaluate the knowledge constructed by them by applying it
to reality: perform destructive tests of tools, devise criti-
cal empirical tests of theories concerning nature, apply and
evaluate theories concerning social and economic relations;
in general, we can consider this as a generalized principle
of falsiﬁcation, broader than deﬁned by Karl Popper even
in his later works [19].
Such a process can be represented as a general spiral of
evolutionary knowledge creation, see Fig. 1. We observe
reality (either in nature or in society) and its changes, com-
pare our observations with human heritage in knowledge
(the transition Observation). Then our intuitive and emo-
tive knowledge helps us to generate new hypotheses (En-
lightenment) or to create new tools; we apply them to exist-
ing reality (Application), usually with the goal of achieving
some changes, modiﬁcations of reality (Modification); we
observe them again.
Fig. 1. The general OEAM spiral of evolutionary knowledge
creation.
It is important, however, to note that many other transitions
enhance this spiral. First is the natural evolution in time:
modiﬁed reality becomes existing reality through Recourse.
Second is the evolutionary selection of tested knowledge:
most new knowledge might be somehow recorded, but only
the positively tested knowledge, resilient to falsiﬁcation
attempts, remains an important part of human heritage
(Evaluation); this can be interpreted as an objectifying,
stabilizing feedback. Naturally, there might be also other
transitions between the nodes indicated in the spiral model,
but the transitions indicated in Fig. 1 are the most essential
ones.
Thus, nature is not only the eﬀect of construction of knowl-
edge by people, nor is it only the cause of knowledge: it
is both cause and eﬀect in a positive feedback loop, where
more knowledge results in more modiﬁcations of nature
and more modiﬁcations result in more knowledge. As it
is typical for positive feedback loops, the overall result is
an avalanche-like growth; and this avalanche-like growth, if
unchecked by stabilizing negative feedbacks, beside tremen-
dous opportunities creates also diverse dangers, usually not
immediately perceived but lurking in the future. Thus, the
importance of selecting knowledge that is as objective as
possible relates also to the fact that avalanche-like growth
creates diverse threats: we must leave to our children best
possible knowledge in order to prepare them for dealing
with unknown future.
This description of a spiral-like, evolutionary character
of knowledge creation is consistent with our technologi-
cal cognitive horizon, and slightly diﬀerent than presented
in [9] from a position of an economic cognitive horizon.
It is an extension of the concept of objective knowledge
promoted by Popper [19], but admits relativistic interpreta-
tions; it only postulates objectivity as a higher level value,
similar to justice: both absolute justice and absolute ob-
jectivity might be not attainable, but are important, worth
striving for, particularly if we take into account uncertainty
about future (see also [21]).
After outlining this philosophic background, we can turn
now to the problem of objective versus subjective ranking
of decision options. We start, however, with an outline of
reference point approaches to the problem of ranking.
3. Reference point approaches:
the discrete case
We assume here that the admissible decisions are given by
just a list of considered decision options xk ∈ X0, where X0
denotes the set of these options. We assume that we have
a decision problem with J criteria, indexed by j = 1, . . . ,J
(also denoted by j∈ J), and K decision options called also
alternatives, indexed by k = 1, . . . ,K or k = A,B, . . . ,H (also
denoted by k ∈K = {1, . . . ,K}). The corresponding crite-
ria values are denoted by q jk; we assume that all are max-
imized or converted to maximized variables. The maximal
values maxk∈K q jk = q
up
j are called upper bounds for crite-
ria and are often equivalent to the components of so called
ideal or utopia point quto = qup = (qup1 , . . . ,q
up
j , . . . ,q
up
J ) –
except for cases when they were established a priori as
a measurement scale. The minimal values mink∈K q jk = qloj
are called lower bounds and, generally, are not equivalent
to the components of so called nadir point qnad ≥ qlo =
(qlo1 , . . . ,q
lo
j , . . . ,q
lo
J ); the nadir point q
nad is deﬁned sim-
ilarly as the lower bound point qlo, but with minimiza-
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tion restricted to Pareto optimal or eﬃcient or nondomi-
nated alternatives (see, e.g., [3]). An alternative k∗ ∈ K is
Pareto optimal (Pareto-nondominated or shortly nondom-
inated, also called eﬃcient), if there is no other alterna-
tive k ∈ K that dominates k∗, that is, if we denote qk =
(q1k, . . . ,q jk, . . . ,qJk), there is no k ∈K such that qk ≥ qk∗ ,
qk 6= qk∗ .
While the reference point approach is typically described
for the continuous case (with a nonempty interior of X0,
thus an inﬁnite number of options in this set), we shall
concentrate here on the discrete case, with a ﬁnite num-
ber of decision options K, for which case the reference
point approach is equally or even particularly suitable. This
is because when we consider the outcome set Q0, that
is, the set of criteria vectors qk corresponding to deci-
sion options xk, is in this case obviously not convex, and
important elements of Pareto outcome set might be con-
tained in the interior, not on the boundary of the convex
cover of this set. Thus, with any other method – partic-
ularly with a weighted sum, but also with many nonlin-
ear utility approximations – we run the risk of missing
important Pareto points in the discrete case. We do not
have this risk when using reference point approaches, be-
cause of their full controllability property, not possessed
by utility functions nor by weighted sums, see later com-
ments.
The most general speciﬁcation of preferences of a deci-
sion maker contains a selection of decision outcomes cho-
sen as criteria, accompanied by deﬁning a partial order in
the space of criteria – simply asking the decision maker
which criteria should be maximized and which minimized
(or stabilized). Here we consider only the simplest case
when all criteria are maximized.
When analyzing a decision problem in the discrete case,
we might be interested in:
– ﬁnding the best solution (option),
– ﬁnding all Pareto-optimal solutions (options),
– ranking all options,
– classifying all options.
Here we shall consider mostly the problem of ranking.
There are several versions of methods belonging to the
general class of reference point approaches (see [15, 26]).
Here we describe a method based on a speciﬁcation of dou-
ble reference levels – aspiration level a j and reservation
level r j – for each criterion. After this speciﬁcation, the
approach uses a nonlinear aggregation of criteria by an
achievement function that is performed in two steps.
We ﬁrst count achievements for each individual criterion
or satisfaction with its values by transforming it (mono-
tonically and piece-wise linearly), e.g., in the case of
maximized criteria as shown in Eq. (1) below. In a dis-
crete decision problem we can choose these coeﬃcients to
have a reasonable interpretation of the values of the par-
tial (or individual) achievement function. Since the range
of [0; 10] points is often used for eliciting expert opin-
ions about subjectively evaluated criteria or achievements,
we adopted this range in Eq. (1) below for the values of
a partial achievement function σ j(q j, a j, r j):
σ j(q j,a j,r j)=


α(q j−qloj )
(r j−qloj )
for qloj ≤ q j < r j,
α +(β−α)(q j−r j)
(a j−r j)
for r j ≤ q j < a j,
β +(10−β )(q j−a j)
(qupj −a j)
for a j ≤ q j ≤ qupj .
(1)
The parameters α and β , 0 < α < β < 10, in this case
denote correspondingly the values of the partial achieve-
ment function for q j = r j and q j = a j. The value σ jk =
σ j(q jk,a j,r j) of this achievement function for a given alter-
native k∈K signiﬁes the satisfaction level with the criterion
value for this alternative. Thus, the above transformation
assigns satisfaction levels from 0 to α (say, α = 3) for cri-
terion values between qloj and r j , from α to β (say, β = 7)
for criterion values between r j and a j, from β to 10 for
criterion values between a j and qupj .
After this transformation of all criteria values, we might
use then the following form of the overall achievement
function:
σ(q,a,r) = min
j∈J
ji(q j,ai,r j)+ ε/J ∑
j∈J
σ j(q j,a j,r j) , (2)
where q = (q1, . . .q j, . . .qJ) is the vector of criteria val-
ues, a = (a1, . . .a j, . . .aJ) and r = (r1, . . . r j, . . . rJ) are the
vectors of aspiration and reservation levels, while ε > 0 is
a small regularizing coeﬃcient. The achievement values
σk = σ(qk,a,r) for all k ∈ K can be used either to select
the best alternative, or to order the options in an overall
ranking list or classiﬁcation list, starting with the highest
achievement value.
The properties of such functions are, also for the discrete
case:
– partial order approximation: the level sets of such
functions approximate closely the positive cone
deﬁning the partial order (see [24]);
– full controllability: given any point q∗ in crite-
ria space that is (properly, with a priori bounded
trade-oﬀ coeﬃcients1) Pareto-nondominated and cor-
responds to some decision option, we can always
1By a properly Pareto-nondominated option with a priori bounded trade-
oﬀ coeﬃcients, called also an ε-properly Pareto-nondominated alternative,
we understand a Pareto-nondominated alterbnative with trade-oﬀ coeﬃ-
cients bounded by a given large number, e.g., the number 1 + 1/ε [26].
The property that any ε-properly Pareto-nondominated alternative can be
selected as the best by maximizing an achievement function is called the
controllability property and is much stronger than the eﬃciency property
(that any maximum of a function, which is strictly monotone with respect
to the partial order, is Pareto-nondominated). The controllability property
is possessed by functions such as (2) that are not only strictly monotone
with respect to the partial order, but also have level sets approximating
the positive cone that deﬁnes the partial order. This property does not
depend on convexity assumptions [24].
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choose such reference levels – in fact, it suﬃces to
set aspiration levels equal to the components of q∗ –
that the maximum of the achievement function (2) is
attained precisely at this point;
– dependence of implied weighting coeﬃcients on the
currently speciﬁed reference points (see [26]);
– possibility of using ε = 0 with nucleolar minimax ap-
proach [12, 16]: consider ﬁrst the minimal, worst in-
dividual criterion achievement σ j computed as above
with ε = 0; if two options k1 and k2 (or more of
them) have the same achievement value, we order
them according to the second worst individual crite-
rion achievement, and so on.
4. The issue of objective ranking
The ranking of discrete options is a classical problem
of multi-attribute decision analysis; however, all classical
approaches – whether of Keeney and Raiﬀa [11], or of
Saaty [22], or of Keeney [10] – concentrate on subjective
ranking. By this we do not mean intuitive subjective rank-
ing, which can be done by any experienced decision maker
based on her/his intuition, but rational subjective ranking,
based on the data relevant for the decision situation – how-
ever, using an approximation of personal preferences in ag-
gregating multiple criteria.
And therein is the catch: in many practical situations, if the
decision maker wants to have a computerized decision sup-
port and rational ranking, she/he does not want to use per-
sonal preferences, prefers to have some objective ranking.
This is often because the decision is not only a personal one,
but aﬀects many people – and it is usually very diﬃcult to
achieve an intersubjective rational ranking, accounting for
personal preferences of all people involved. This obvious
fact is best illustrated by the following example.
Suppose an international corporation consists of six divi-
sions A–F. Suppose these units are characterized by di-
verse data items, such as name, location, number of em-
ployees, etc. However, suppose that the Chief Executive
Oﬃcer (CEO) of this corporation is really interested in
ranking or classiﬁcation of these divisions taking into ac-
count the following attributes used as criteria: 1) proﬁt
(in % of revenue), 2) market share (m.share, in % of sup-
plying a speciﬁc market sector), 3) internal collaboration
(i.trade, in % of revenue coming from supplying other
divisions of the corporation), and 4) local social image
(l.s.i., meaning public relations in the society where it is
located, evaluated on a scale 0–100 points). All these cri-
teria are maximized, improve when increased. An example
of data of this type is shown in Table 1 (with data distorted
for privacy reasons).
Suppose the CEO of this corporation hires a consulting
company and asks for an objective ranking of these six
divisions. The approach that can be easily adapted for ra-
tional objective ranking is reference point approach – be-
cause reference levels needed in this approach can be either
deﬁned subjectively by the decision maker, or established
objectively statistically from the given data set. We can use
this approach not only for objective ranking, but also for
objective classiﬁcation, using methods as indicated above
with objectively deﬁned reference points.
In the next section, we shall show below how to apply this
approach for the simple example given in Table 1. We de-
noted by q jk the value of a criterion q j for the decision op-
tion k ∈K , and the achievement values σk = σ(qk,a,r) for
all k∈K can be used to order the options in an overall rank-
ing list, starting with the highest achievement value. Now,
the question is: how to deﬁne aspiration levels a and reser-
vation levels r in order to obtain rational objective ranking?
Several ways were listed in [5]: neutral, statistical, voting;
we shall concentrate here on statistical determination.
A statistical determination of reference levels concerns val-
ues m j that would be used as basic reference levels, an
upward modiﬁcation of these values to obtain aspiration
levels a j, and a downward modiﬁcation of these values to
obtain reservation levels r j; these might be deﬁned as fol-
lows:
m j =∑
k∈K
q jk/K; r j =0.5(qloj +m j); a j=0.5(q
up
j +m j), ∀ j∈J ,
(3)
where K denotes the number of alternative options, thus
m j are just average values of criteria in the set of all al-
ternative options; aspiration and reservation levels – just
averages of these averages and the lower and upper bounds,
respectively.
However, there are no essential reasons why we should limit
the averaging to the set of alternative options ranked; we
could use as well a larger set of data in order to deﬁne
more adequate (say, historically meaningful) averages, or
a smaller set – e.g., only the Pareto optimal options – in
order to deﬁne more demanding averages and aspirations.
For very large data sets, we can use, e.g., evolutionary
(EMO) algorithms for an approximation of the Pareto set.
Variants of objective ranking. For the data from Table 1,
we can thus present two variants of objective ranking:
– A: based on averages of data from this table,
– B: based on averages from Pareto optimal options.
See next Tables 2 and 3. Note that the more demand-
ing ranking B displays a rank reversal: the divisions C
and E, occupying positions 2 and 3 in ranking A, exchange
their places in ranking B. This is, however, a natural phe-
nomenon: average aspirations favour standard though good
solutions, truly interesting solutions result from demanding
aspirations (however, this rank reversal might disappear, if
we use diﬀerent values of the parameter ε).
Note also that the rank reversal also disappears if, instead
of ranking, we classify the divisions into three classes:
– I: very good,
– II: good,
– III: wanting.
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Table 1
Data for an example on international business management (∗ denotes Pareto options)
Division Name Location Employees
Proﬁt – q1 M.share – q2 I.trade – q3
L.s.i. – q4[%] [%] [%]
A Alpha USA 250 11 8 10 40
B∗ Beta Brasilia 750 23 40 34 60
C∗ Gamma China 450 16 50 45 70
D∗ Delta Dubai 150 35 20 20 44
E∗ Epsilon C. Europe 350 18 30 20 80
F Fi France 220 12 8 9 30
Table 2
Example of objective ranking for data from Table 1, based on averages of all options
Ranking A σ1 σ2 σ3 σ4 σ Rank Class
Division
A 0.00 0.00 0.37 2.50 0.29 5 III
B 5.63 7.50 7.00 5.88 8.23 1 I
C 3.30 10.0 10.0 7.62 6.39 2 II
D 10.0 3.57 3.89 3.32 5.40 4 II
E 3.97 5.48 3.89 10.0 6.30 3 II
F 0.73 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.07 6 III
Table 3
Example of objective ranking for data from Table 1, based on averages of Pareto-nondominated options
Ranking B σ1 σ2 σ3 σ4 σ Rank Class
Division
A 0.00 0.00 0.29 1.80 0.21 5 III
B 5.00 6.61 6.24 5.13 7.30 1 I
C 2.50 10.0 10.0 6.73 5.28 3 II
D 10.0 3.47 3.13 2.51 4.42 4 II
E 3.33 5.04 3.13 10.0 5.43 3 II
F 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 6 III
Both divisions C and E remain in the class II, both for the
average and for the more demanding aspirations.
In some management applications, the worst ranked op-
tions are the most interesting, because they indicate the
need of a corrective action. Objective ranking was orig-
inally motivated by an actual application when evaluating
scientiﬁc creativity conditions in a Japanese research uni-
versity, Japan Advanced Institute of Science and Technol-
ogy (JAIST), (see [23]). Actually, it is misleading to call
it an application; a real life problem was ﬁrst solved inno-
vatively, which motivated later the development of theory.
This often happens in technology development: technology
is not necessarily and not only an application of basic nat-
ural science, it often precedes theoretical developments –
such as invention of a wheel preceded the concept of a cir-
cle, a telescope preceded optics.
The evaluation was based on survey results. The survey in-
cluded 48 questions with diverse answers and over 140 re-
spondents with diverse characteristics: school aﬃliation
(JAIST consists of three schools), nationality (Japanese or
foreign – the latter constitute over 10% of young researchers
at JAIST), research position (master students, doctoral stu-
dents, research associates, etc.). In total, the data base was
not very large, but large enough to create computational
problems.
The questions were of three types:
– assessment questions, assessing the situation between
students and at the university; the most critical ques-
tions of this type might be selected as those that cor-
respond to worst responses;
– importance questions, assessing importance of
a given subject; the most important questions might
be considered as those that correspond to best re-
sponses;
– controlling questions, testing the answers to the ﬁrst
two types by indirect questioning revealing responder
attitudes or asking for a detailed explanation.
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For the ﬁrst two type of questions, responders were required
to tick appropriate responses in the scale vg (very good),
g (good), a (average), b (bad), vb (very bad) – sometimes
in an inverted scale if the questions were negatively for-
mulated. Answers to all questions of ﬁrst two types were
evaluated on a common scale, as a percentage distribution
(histogram) of answers vg−g−a−b−vb. The interpreta-
tion of the evaluation average was almost bad; if we want
most answers to be very good and good, we admit not many
to be average.
Therefore, in this case J = G ∪ B, G = {vg, g}, B =
{a, b, vb}; the statistical distributions (percentage his-
tograms) of answers were interpreted in the sense of mul-
tiple criteria optimization, with j ∈G = {vg, g} as quality
indicators that should be maximized, and j ∈B = {a, b,vb}
as quality indicators to be minimized.
A reference point approach was proposed for this particular
case of ranking probability distributions; other approaches
are usually more complicated (see, e.g., [17]). However,
when the dean of the School of Knowledge Science in
JAIST (Yoshiteru Nakamori) was asked to deﬁne his prefer-
ences or preferred aspiration levels, the reality of the man-
agerial situation overcome his theoretical background: he
responded “in this case, I want the ranking to be as objec-
tive as possible – I must discuss the results with the deans
of other schools and with all professors”. This was the
origin of reﬂection on objective versus subjective rational
ranking.
Thus, a statistical average of the percentages of answers in
the entire data set was taken as the reference distribution
or proﬁle. Since such a reference proﬁle might result in
good but standard answers, some artiﬁcial reference distri-
butions were also constructed as more demanding than the
average one; averages over Pareto optimal options were not
computed because of the complexity of the data set.
The detailed results of the survey were also very useful
for university management (see [23]). It was found that
seven questions of the ﬁrst (assessment) type ranked as
worst practically did not depend on the variants of rank-
ing; thus, the objective ranking gave robust results as to
the problems that required most urgent intervention by the
university management. The best ranked questions of the
second (importance) type were more changeable, only three
of them consistently were ranked among the best ones in
diverse ranking proﬁles. Moreover, a rank reversal phe-
nomenon was observed: if the average reference distribu-
tion was used, best ranked were questions of rather obvious
type, more interesting results were obtained when using
more demanding reference proﬁle.
Another possible application of the concept of objective
ranking is the issue of detecting a signiﬁcant event in a net-
work (say, a failure of a link in a computer network). We
can observe certain characteristic variables in the network
and their histograms – empirical probability distributions.
In the case of failure, these probability distributions will
change as compared to the case of normal network func-
tions; the issue is to use such change to identify the type
of the event. Thus, the decision options k ∈K in this prob-
lem are possible types of events; for each type of event, we
might have a reference probability distribution, obtained,
e.g., via network simulation. In such a case, the detection
of the type of event is equivalent to checking which ref-
erence probability distribution is the closest to the actual
empirical distribution; this can be done using also reference
proﬁle approach with stabilized criteria. However, another
approach is to try to deﬁne a partial order in the space
of histograms that would represent the given problem of
event detection, and use an objective ranking approach to
produce a ranking list of types of events, given an empir-
ical histogram. This will be the subject of further studies
(see [6]).
5. Conclusions
We discussed in this paper some aspects of the general issue
of objectivity versus subjectivity, with the conclusion that
objectivity is a higher value, similar to justice: it might be
not fully attainable, but it is worth striving for. We have also
shown that the reduction of objectivity to power and money,
suggested by postmodern sociology of science, is not only
based on superﬁcial reductionism, but also contains logical
errors.
We presented in this paper the issue of objective ranking
deﬁned as dependent only on a given set of data, relevant
for the decision situation, and independent of any more de-
tailed speciﬁcation of personal preferences than that given
by deﬁning criteria and the partial order in criterion space.
Rational objective ranking can be based on reference point
approach, because reference levels needed in this approach
can be established objectively statistically from the given
data set.
Examples show that such objective ranking can be very
useful in many management situations.
There are several possible topics for further study, such
as the relation of objective ranking obtained by reference
point approaches and objective ranking obtained by rough
set approaches, since the latter also can be seen as depen-
dent only on a given set of data, on an informational system
in the sense of Zdzisław Pawlak (see [18] and [7]), or the
issue of using multiobjective comparison of empirical sta-
tistical proﬁles for event detection in telecommunication
networks [6].
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